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ABSTRACT
While smartphone usage become more and more pervasive,
people start also asking to which extent such devices can be
maliciously exploited as “tracking devices”. The concern is
not only related to an adversary taking physical or remote
control of the device (e.g., via a malicious app), but also to
what a passive adversary (without the above capabilities)
can observe from the device communications. Work in this
latter direction aimed, for example, at inferring the apps a
user has installed on his device, or identifying the presence
of a specific user within a network.
In this paper, we move a step forward: we investigate to
which extent it is feasible to identify the specific actions that
a user is doing on his mobile device, by simply eavesdrop-
ping the device’s network traffic. In particular, we aim at
identifying actions like browsing someone’s profile on a social
network, posting a message on a friend’s wall, or sending an
email. We design a system that achieves this goal starting
from encrypted TCP/IP packets: it works through identifi-
cation of network flows and application of machine learning
techniques. We did a complete implementation of this sys-
tem and run a thorough set of experiments, which show that
it can achieve accuracy and precision higher than 95%, for
most of the considered actions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones become widely used and pervasive devices. Peo-
ple continuously carry those devices with them and use them
more and more for daily communication activities, includ-
ing not only voice calls and SMS but also emails and social
network interaction. In the last years, several concerns have
been raised about the capabilities of those portable devices
to invade the privacy of the users and actually becoming
“tracking devices”. In particular, one aspect is concerned
with the possibility of continuously localize an individual
[4, 38]. Another relevant aspect is related to the fact that
malicious apps can go even a step further in tracing and spy-
ing on someone life. For example, a malicious app that has
access to the microphone and networking capabilities, could
in principle continuously eavesdrop the audio and send it
over the Internet to an adversary [35].
Even when the adversary has no actual control of the phone
(either physical control or remote via malicious apps) other
attacks in the same directions are possible to violate the
privacy of the communications. If the network traffic is not
encrypted, the task of the eavesdropper is simple, since he
can analyze the payload and read the content of each packet.
However, many mobile apps use the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL), and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS), as
a building block for encrypted communications. In a typ-
ical SSL/TLS usage scenario, a server is configured with a
certificate containing a public key as well as a matching pri-
vate key. As part of the handshake between an SSL/TLS
client and server, the server proves it has the private key by
signing its certificate with public-key cryptography. Unfor-
tunately there is often a gap between theory and practice,
e.g., leveraging the SSL vulnerabilities of smartphone apps
[18, 20] one might run an SSL man-in-the-middle attack to
compromise the confidentiality of communications.
We believe that while people become more familiar with
mobile technologies and their related privacy threats (also
thanks to the attention raised by the media, e.g., see the
recent attention on NSA for supposedly eavesdropping for-
eign governments leader such as Angela Merkel [38]), users
start adopting some good practices that better adapt to their
privacy feeling and understanding. For examples, solutions
to identify and isolate malware running on smartphones
[34, 40, 46] as well as to protect against attacks coming from
the network [5, 12] might significantly reduce current threats
to user privacy.
Unfortunately, we believe that even adopting such good prac-
tices would not close the door to malicious adversaries will-
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ing to trace people. In fact, the wireless and pervasive nature
of mobile devices would still leave many practical options for
adversarial tracing. In particular, even when such solutions
are in place, the adversary can still infer a significant amount
of information from the properly encrypted traffic. For ex-
ample, work leveraging analysis of encrypted traffic already
highlighted the possibility of understanding the apps a user
has installed on his device [39], or identify the presence of a
specific user within a network [41].
This work focuses on understanding whether the user profil-
ing made through analyzing encrypted traffic can be pushed
up to understand exactly what actions the user is doing on
his phone: as concrete examples, we aim at identifying ac-
tions such as the user sending an email, receiving an email,
browsing someone profile in a social network, rather than
publishing a post or a tweet. The underlying issue we lever-
age in our work is that SSL and TLS protect the content of a
packet, while they do not prevent the detection of networks
packets patterns that instead may reveal some information
about the user behavior.
An adversary may use our approach in several practical ways
to threaten the privacy of the user. In the following, we
report some possible attacks:
• A censorship government may try to identify a dissi-
dent who spreads anti-government propaganda using
an anonymous social network account. Comparing the
time of the public posts with the time of the actions
(inferred with our method), the government can guess
the identity of that anonymous dissident.
• By tracing the actions performed by two users, and
taking into account the communication latency, an ad-
versary may guess (even if with some probability of er-
ror) whether there is a communication between them.
Multiple observations could reduce the probability of
errors.
• An adversary can build a behavioral profile of a target
victim based on the habits of the latter one (e.g., wake
up time, work time). For example, this could be used
to improve user fingerprinting methods, to infer the
presence of a particular user in a network [41], even
when he accesses the network with different type of
devices.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose a framework to
infer which particular actions the user executed on some
app installed on his mobile-phone, by only looking at the
network traffic that the phone generates. In particular, we
assume the traffic is encrypted and the adversary eavesdrops
(without modifying them) the messages exchanged between
the user’s device and the web services that he uses.
Our framework analyzes the network communications and
leverages information available in TCP/IP packets (like IP
addresses and ports), together with other information like
the size, direction (incoming/outgoing), and timing. By us-
ing an approach based on machine learning, each app that is
of interest is analyzed independently. To set up our system,
for each app we first pre-process a dataset of network pack-
ets labeled with the user actions that originated them, we
cluster them in flow typologies that represent recurrent net-
work flows, and finally we analyze them in order to create a
training set that will be used to feed a classifier. The trained
classifier will be then able to classify new traffic traces that
have never been seen before. We fully implemented our sys-
tem, and we run a thorough set of experiments to evaluate
our solution considering three very popular apps: Facebook,
Gmail, and Twitter. The results shows that it can achieve
accuracy and precision higher than 95%, for most of the
considered actions done by the user with those apps.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we revise the state of the art around
our research topic. In Section 3, we introduce some back-
ground knowledge, used in our work, on machine learning
and data mining tools. In Section 4, we present our frame-
work, describing it in all its components. We present the
evaluation of our solution for identifying user actions in Sec-
tion 5, while in Section 6 we discuss about possible counter-
measures against the attack. Finally, in Section 7 we draw
some conclusions.
2. RELATED WORK
Our main claim in this paper is that network traffic analysis
and machine learning can be used to infer private informa-
tion about the user, i.e., the actions that he executes with
his mobile phone, even thought the traffic is encrypted. To
position our contribution with respect to the state of the art,
in this section we survey the works that belong to two main
research areas that focus on similar issues: privacy attacks
via traffic analysis (not necessarily focusing on mobile de-
vices) and traffic analysis of mobile devices (not necessarily
focusing on privacy).
Privacy attacks via traffic analysis. In the literature, sev-
eral works proposed to track user activities on the web by an-
alyzing unencrypted HTTP requests and responses [6, 7, 36].
With this analysis it was possible to understand user actions
inferring interests and habits. However, in recent years, web-
sites and social networks started to use SSL/TLS encryption
protocol, both for web and mobile services. This means that
communications between endpoints are encrypted and this
type of analysis cannot be performed anymore.
Different works surveyed possible attacks that can be per-
formed using traffic analysis assuming a very strong adver-
sary (e.g., a national security agency) which is able to ob-
serve all communication links [8, 33]. In [26], Liberatore et
al. evaluated the effectiveness of two traffic analysis tech-
niques based on naive Bayes and on Jaccard’s coefficient
for identifying encrypted HTTP streams. Such an attack
was outperformed by [23], where the authors presented a
method that applies common text mining techniques to the
normalized frequency distribution of observable IP packet
sizes, obtaining a classifier that correctly identifies up to
97% of requests. The technique was further refined in [31],
where the authors presented a support vector machine clas-
sifier that was able to correctly identify web pages, even
when the victim used both encryption and anonymization
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networks such as Tor [15]. Finally, Cai et al. [10] presented
a web pages fingerprinting attack and proved its effective-
ness despite traffic analysis countermeasures, such as Tor
randomized pipelining [32] or HTTPOS [28].
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned works was de-
signed for (or could easily be extended) to mobile devices.
In fact, all of them focus on web pages identification in desk-
top environment (in particular, in desktop browsers), where
the generated HTTP traffic strictly depends on how web
pages are designed. Conversely, mobile users mostly access
the contents through the apps installed on their devices [21].
These apps communicate with a service provider (e.g., Face-
book) through a set of APIs. An example of such differences
between desktop web browsers and mobile apps is the vali-
dation of SSL certificates [12, 20].
Traffic analysis has been applied not only to HTTP but also
to other protocols. For example, Song et al. [37] prove that
SSH is not secure. In particular, they show that even very
simple statistical techniques suffice to reveal sensitive in-
formation such as login passwords. More importantly, the
authors show that by using more advanced statistical tech-
niques on timing information collected from the network, the
eavesdropper can also learn significant information about
what users type in SSH sessions. SSH is not the only proto-
col that has been target of such attacks. Another example
is Voice Over IP (VoIP). In particular, in [44], the authors
show how the length of encrypted VoIP packets can be used
to identify spoken phrases of a variable bit rate encoded
call. Their work indicates that a profile Hidden Markov
Model trained using speaker- and phrase-independent data
can detect the presence of some phrases within encrypted
VoIP calls with recall and precision exceeding 90%.
In [11], the authors show that despite encryption, also web
applications suffer from side-channel leakages. The system
model considered is different from our. In particular, their
focus is on web applications. On the contrary, we focus on
mobile applications. More importantly, the authors lever-
age three fundamental features of web applications: stateful
communication; low entropy input; significant traffic dis-
tinction. We believe that in most mobile applications two of
these features (stateful communication, low entropy input)
are not very useful to characterize user actions. In contrast
to this work, we adopt a solution that only needs informa-
tion about packet sizes and their order.
Traffic analysis of mobile devices. Focusing on mobile
devices, traffic analysis has been successfully used to detect
information leaks [17], to profile users by their set of in-
stalled apps [39], and to produce the fingerprint of an app
from its unencrypted HTTP traffic [13]. Traffic analysis has
also been used to understand network traffic characteris-
tics, with particular attention on energy saving [19]. Stober
et al. [39] shown that it is possible to identify the set of
apps installed on an Android device, by eavesdropping the
3G/UMTS traffic that those apps generate. Similarly, Ton-
gaonkar et al. [13] introduced an automatic app profiler that
creates the network fingerprint of an Android app relying on
packet payload inspection, in order to re-identify its HTTP
traffic. In [47], Zhou et al. present a work that take in con-
sideration the traffic produced a user action performed with
Twitter app. Unfortunately, the authors focused on a sin-
gle user action (i.e., send a tweet) without distinguish that
action from the other ones a user could perform.
None of the works mentioned in this section aim at inferring
and distinguish user actions performed by the user with his
mobile apps, which is the goal of our paper.
3. MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA MIN-
ING BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly recall several machine learning
and data mining concepts that we use in our paper, while
we point the reader to appropriate references for a complete
introduction on those topics.
3.1 Dynamic Time Warping
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [30] is a useful method to
find alignments between two time-dependent sequences (also
referred as time series) which may vary in time or speed.
This method is also used to measure the distance or simi-
larity between time series.
Let us consider two sequences that represent two discrete
signals: X = (x1, . . . , xN ) of length N ∈ N; and Y =
(y1, . . . , ym) of length M ∈ N. DTW uses a local dis-
tance measure c : R × R → R≥0 to calculate a cost ma-
trix C ∈ RN×M , s.t., each cell Ci,j reports the distance
between xi and yj . The goal is to find an alignment be-
tween X and Y having minimal overall distance. Intu-
itively, such an optimal alignment runs along a “valley” of
low cost cells within the cost matrix C. More formally, a
warping path is defined as a sequence p = (p1, . . . , pL) with
pl = (nl,ml) ∈ [1 : N ] × [1 : M ], l ∈ [1 : L] satisfying the
following three conditions:
1. Boundary condition: p1 = (1, 1) and pL = (N,M);
2. Monotonicity condition: n1 ≤ n2 ≤ . . . ≤ nM and
m1 ≤ m2 ≤ . . . ≤ mL;
3. Step size condition: pl+1 − pl = {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
for l ∈ [1 : L− 1].
The total cost of a warping path is calculated as the sum of
all the local distances of its elements. An optimal warping
path is a warping path p∗ having minimal total cost among
all possible working paths. The total cost of an optimal
warping path is also used as a distance measure between
two sequences X and Y . In this paper, we will indicate the
cost of an optimal warping path with DTW (X,Y ).
3.2 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a cluster analysis method which
seeks to build a hierarchy of clusters. This clustering method
has the distinct advantage that any valid measure of distance
can be used. In fact, the observations themselves are not
required: all that is used is a matrix of distances.
In the following we will use a type of hierarchical clustering
that is called agglomerative: each observation starts in its
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own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged as one moves
up the hierarchy. In order to decide which clusters should be
combined, a metric (a measure of distance between pairs of
observations) and a linkage criterion are required. Since we
will clusterize time-dependent sequences, we will use the to-
tal cost of an optimal warping path as distance metric. As for
the linkage criterion, that determines the distance between
sets of observations as a function of the pairwise distances
between observations, we will use the average distance, that
is defined as:
d(u, v) =
∑
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤m
d(u[i], v[j])
|u| ∗ |v| ,
where d() is a distance function, and u and v are two clus-
ters of n and m elements, respectively. More details about
Hierarchical clustering can be found in [22].
3.3 Supervised Learning
Supervised machine learning algorithms learns from labeled
instances or examples, which are collected in the past and
represent past experiences in some real-world applications.
They produce an inferred model, which can be then used for
mapping or classifying new instances. An optimal scenario
will allow for the algorithm to correctly determine the class
labels for unseen instances.
In this paper, we will use an ensemble classifier that is called
Random Forest [9]. The main principle behind ensemble
methods is that a group of “weak learners” can be combined
together to form a“strong learner”. Random forest leverages
a standard machine learning technique called“decision tree”,
which, in ensemble terms, corresponds to the weak learner.
In practice, it combines together the results of several de-
cision trees trained with different portions of the training
dataset and different subsets of features. More details about
the Random Forest classifier can be found in [9].
4. OUR FRAMEWORK
In this section we describe our framework. In particular,
Section 4.1 introduces the pre-processing steps that allow
us to model the network traffic. Section 4.2 describes the
methodology used to build training and test dataset, and
the procedure used to classify user actions.
4.1 Network Traffic Pre-Processing
Mobile apps generally rely on SSL/TLS to securely com-
municate with peers. These protocols are built on the top
of the TCP/IP suite. The TCP layer receives encrypted
data from the above layer, it divides data into chunks if the
packets exceeds a give size. Then, for each chunk it adds a
TCP header creating a TCP segment. Each TCP segment is
encapsulated into an Internet Protocol (IP) datagram, and
exchanged with peers. Since TCP packets do not include
a session identifier, both endpoints identify a TCP session
using the client’s IP address and the port number.
A fundamental entity considered in this paper is the traffic
flow : with this term we indicate a time ordered sequence of
TCP packets exchanged between two peers during a single
TCP session. We model each network flow as a set of time
series: (i) a time series is obtained by considering the bytes
transported by incoming packets only; (ii) another one is ob-
tained by considering bytes transported by outgoing pack-
ets only; (iii) a third one is obtained by combining (ordered
by time) bytes transported by both incoming and outgoing
packets. Additional time series may be obtained for exam-
ple by considering other parameters such as the time-gap
between different packets. However, we will only use the
first three types mentioned above. The use of time series
allows to represent network flows making them independent
from the properties of the connection. Table 1 reports an
example of time series generated from three network flows,
while Figure 1 graphically represents these flows through a
cumulative chart. The lower side of the chart represents
incoming traffic, while the upper side represents outgoing
traffic. This is only one of the possible representations, and
it shows that the “shapes” of these three network flows are
quite different. Intuitively, our classification approach aims
to identify the “shape” of unseen flows.
Figure 1: Representation of flows time series.
Before generating for each flow the corresponding set of time
series, a few pre-processing steps have to be performed. In
particular: 1) we apply a domain filtering to select only
flows belonging to the analyzed app; 2) we filter the re-
maining flows, in order to delete packets that may degrade
the precision of our approach (i.e., we filter out ACK and
retransmitted packets); 3) we limit the length of the gener-
ated time-series. In the following, we will detail these three
pre-processing steps.
Domain filtering. The network traffic generated by an ap-
plication is generally directed toward a back-end infrastruc-
ture, that may be identified with a single server, or a set
of servers that may be even behind a load balance. Since
we analyze each app independently, we need to make sure
that traffic generated from apps other than the considered
one (or traffic generated by the OS) do not interfere with
the analysis. Different methods can be used in order to
identify the app that generated each network flows. The
destination IP address is a trivial discriminating parameter.
However, in case of a load balanced back-end, we should
know all the individual IP addresses that can be involved
in the communication. The same happens when the back-
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Flow ID Time series type Time series
Flow 1
Incoming [1514, 1514, 315, 113, 477]
Outgoing [282, 188, 514, 96, 1514, 179, 603, 98, 801, 98]
Complete [282, -1514, -1514, -315, 188, -113, 514, 96, 1514, 179, 603, 98, 801, 98, -477]
Flow 2
Incoming [1514, 1514, 1266, 582, 113, 661]
Outgoing [282, 188, 692, 423]
Complete [282, -1514, -1514, -1266, -582, 188, -113, 692, 423, -661]
Flow 3
Incoming [1245, 1514, 107, 465, 172, 111]
Outgoing [926, 655, 136, 913, 1514, 1514, 863]
Complete [926, 655, 136, -1245, 913, 1514, 1514, 863, -1514, -107, -465, -172, -111]
Table 1: Example of time series generated from three network flows. Values within square brackets represent the amount of
bytes exchanged per packet: negative values in complete time series indicate incoming bytes, while positive values indicate
outgoing bytes.
end is composed by several components such as different
web services, databases, etc. To overcome this problem we
use another strategy: we take into consideration for further
analysis only the flows which destination IP addresses own-
ers have been clearly identified as related to the considered
app. In the implementation of our framework, we leverage
the WHOIS protocol for this purpose, but we want to high-
light that this is only one of the possible way. Business and
other context information may be used in order to perform
the domain filtering. We also take into consideration the
traffic related to third parties services (such as Akamai or
Amazon) that are indeed used by several applications [42].
Packets filtering. Due to network congestion, traffic load
balancing, or other unpredictable network behavior, IP pack-
ets can be lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order. TCP
detects these problems, hence requesting retransmission of
lost data, and reordering out-of-order data. It comes out
that several TCP packets that do not carry data, may hin-
der the analysis process. In the data exchange phase, for
example, the receiver sends a packet with the ACK flag set
to notify the correct reception of a chunk of data. These
ACK packets are transmitted in asynchronous mode so they
are affected by many factors related to round trip time of
the connection link. The order of the received packets may
hinder the evaluation of the similarity between two network
flows. For this reason, we filter out all packets retransmis-
sions, as well as packets marked with the ACK flag. Note
that the metric that we will use in order to measure simi-
larity between flows (see Section 4.2) will mitigate the con-
sequences of a missing packet. We filter out also other
packets that do not bring any additional information help-
ful in characterize flows. In particular, we filter out the three
way handshake executed to open a TCP connection, and the
packets exchanged to close it.
Timeout and packets interval. Two different techniques
are used to limit the length of the generated time series: a
timeout mechanism and the specification of a packets inter-
val. The timeout mechanism is used to terminate the flows
that did not receive any new packet since 4.5 seconds. In-
deed, it has been proved experimentally that 95% of all pack-
ets arrive at most 4.43 seconds after their predecessors [39].
The packets interval specifies the first and the last packet to
be considered. For example, considering a flow f composed
by l packets, and the interval [x, y] with x ≤ y and y ≤ l, the
corresponding time series will be composed by y−x+ 1 val-
ues that report the bytes of the xth to the yth packet. This
simple mechanism allows us to focus on particular portions
of the flow. The first part, for example, is often the more
significant. In the experimental part, we report the results
for different configurations of packets intervals, showing that
the best configuration is app dependent.
4.2 Classification of User Action
Since we use a supervised learning approach, it is necessary
to create a labeled dataset that describes the user actions
that we want to classify. In order to build this dataset, we
simulate a series of user actions, and for each one we identify
the flows generated after the execution of the action itself.
For each app that we analyze we focus on actions that are
significant for that particular app.
In most cases, a single user action generates a set of differ-
ent flows (i.e., not just a single one). Furthermore, different
user actions may generate different sets of flows. Our classi-
fication method is based on the detection of the sets of flows
that are distinctive of a particular user action. In order to
elicit these distinctive sets of flows, we build clusters of flows
by using the agglomerative clustering approach described in
Section 3.2. Flows that are similar one to each other will
be grouped together in the same cluster, while not similar
flows will be assigned to in different clusters. The average
distance is used as linkage criterion, while the computation
of the distance between two flows combines the distances of
the corresponding time series. Supposing that each flow fi
is decomposed into a set of n time series {T i1 , . . . , T in}, the
distance between fi and fj is defined as:
dist(fi, fj) =
n∑
k=1
wk ×DTW (T ik, T jk ),
where wk is a weight assigned to the particular time series.
Weights can be assigned in such a way to give more impor-
tance to some type of time series with respect to others. For
example, it is possible to give more weight to the time series
that represent incoming packets, and less weight to those
that represent outgoing packets.
In order to reduce the computational burden of the subse-
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quent classification, a leader is elected for each cluster. Lead-
ers will be the representative flows of their clusters. Given
a cluster C containing the flows {f1, . . . , fn}, the leader is
elected by selecting the flow fi that has minimum overall
distance from the other members of the cluster, that is:
arg min
fi∈C
(
n∑
j=1
dist(fi, fj)
)
.
Clustering is executed over the set of flows that will be used
to build the training dataset. The cluster leaders will be used
to build both the training and the test datasets. The user
actions will be the instances of the datasets, while the class
of each instance is a label representing the action. We will
have one integer feature for each cluster identified through
the agglomerative clustering. The value of each feature is de-
termined by analyzing the flows related to an action. Each
flow f captured after the execution of an action will be as-
signed to the cluster that minimizes the distance between f
and the leader of the cluster. The kth feature will therefore
indicate the number of flows that have been assigned to the
cluster Ck after the execution of that action. For example,
for the action send mail, the kth feature will be equal to 2
if there are 2 flows labeled with send mail assigned to the
cluster Ck.
Finally, we execute the classification with Random Forest
algorithm. The main idea behind the overall approach is
that different actions will “trigger” different sets of clusters.
The classification algorithm will therefore learn which are
these sets, and will be able to correctly determine the class
labels for unseen instances.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to assess the performance of our proposal, we con-
sidered three widespread apps: Gmail, Facebook and Twit-
ter. We select these apps because of their high popularity [1].
Indeed, Gmail is the world’s largest email service [27], and its
Android app has over one billion downloads. On the other
hand, Facebook and Twitter are not only the most popu-
lar Online Social Networks [3], but they also had a leading
role in the Arab spring [43] and the Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi
Park protests [24] (when Turkish government blocked Twit-
ter). We believe that the results we obtain in our analysis
also hold for other apps that provide similar functionalities
(e.g., Yahoo mail, WhatsApp or LinkedIn), while a thorough
evaluation of this claim is left as future work. To collect the
network traffic related to different user actions, we set up
a monitored environment. In this section we present the
elements that compose this environment (Section 5.1), the
methodology used to collect the data (Section 5.2), and the
results of the evaluation (Section 5.3).
5.1 Hardware and Network Configuration
For the evaluation of our solution, we used a Galaxy Nexus
(GT-I9250) smartphone, running the Android 4.1.2 (Jelly
bean) operative system. We enabled the “Android Debug”
option in order to allow the usage of the ADB (Android
Debug Bridge) interface via USB cable. We used a Wi-Fi
access point (U.S. Robotics USR808054) to provide wireless
connectivity to the mobile phone. Finally, we used a server
(Intel Pentium Processor dual core E5400 2.7GHz with 4
GB DDR2 RAM) with two network cards running Ubuntu
Server 11.04 LTS to route the traffic from the access point
to the Internet, and vice versa.
To eavesdrop network packets flowing through the server,
we used Wireshark software. From a Wireshark capture
file, we created a comma separated file (csv), where each
row describes a packet captured from the access point’s in-
terface. For every packet we reported source and destination
IP addresses, ports, size in bytes and time in seconds from
Unix epoch (i.e., 00:00:00 UTC, 01 January 1970), protocol
type and TCP/IP flags. Since the payload is not relevant to
our analysis, it has been omitted. This data have been then
used to generate the time series as explained in Section 4.1.
5.2 Dataset Collection and Analysis
For our study we considered three apps installed from the
official Android market: Gmail v4.7.2 , Facebook v3.8, and
Twitter v4.1.10. For each app, we created 10 accounts that
have been considered in two different categories of users:
“active” and “passive” users. “Active” users simulated the
behavior of users that actively use the app by sending posts,
email, tweets, surfing the various menus, etc. “Passive”
users simulated the behavior of users that passively use the
app, just by receiving messages or posts. The accounts of
both passive and active users have been configured in such a
way to have several friends/followers within the group. We
avoided to configure the accounts with actual friends or fol-
lowers, in order to avoid interference due to notifications of
external users activities that were not under our control.
To reach a particular target, a user may have to perform
several actions in a precise order. An action could be sim-
ple (e.g., a tap on a button, a swipe, or a selection of edit
box), or complex (e.g., type a text, which is a sequence of
keyboard inputs). For example, a user has to perform three
actions in a precise sequence to post a message on his Face-
book wall. He has to be sure that the Facebook app shows
the “user’s wall”, then he has to tap on the “write a post”
button (1), fill the edit box with some text (2), and finally
tap on the “post” button (3). It is important to highlight
that we do not use static text to fill in text boxes, but the
text is randomly selected from a large set of sentences. A
script submits the sequence of actions to the mobile phone
through the ADB commands, and it captures the network
traffic that is generated. The script records also the execu-
tion time of each action. By using the recorded execution
time of each action, it is then possible to label the flows ex-
tracted from the network traffic with the user action that
produced it. For each app, we choose a set of actions that
are more sensitive than others from user privacy point of
view (e.g., send an email or a message, for the reasons we
report in Section 1). The list of these actions is reported
in Table 2. We underline that we do not ignore other user
actions, but we label them as other. In such a way we have
several benefits [29]: we obtain a greater representation of
data in terms of variety and variance of examples; we re-
duce the chances of overfitting; we improve the performance
of the classifier on relevant user actions.
We collected and labeled the traffic generated by 220 se-
quences of actions for each app, where a sequence is com-
posed by 50 types of actions (for a total of 11660 examples
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of actions for Gmail, 6600 for Twitter, and 10120 for Face-
book). The user action examples in the dataset was divided
in a training set and a test set. We use the training set to
train the classifier, while we use the test set to evaluate its
accuracy. We underline that to build the test set we used
accounts that have not been used to create the training set.
By using different accounts to generate the training and the
test set, it is possible to assure that the results of the clas-
sification do not depend on the specific accounts that have
been analyzed.
Facebook
Action Description
send message send a direct message to a friend
post user status post a status on the user’s wall
open user profile select user profile page from menu
open message select a conversation on messages page
status button select “write a post” on user’s wall
post on wall post a message on a friend’s wall
open facebook open the Facebook app
Gmail
Action Description
send mail send a new mail
reply button tap on the reply button
open chats select chats page from menu
send reply send a reply to a received mail
Twitter
Action Description
refresh home Refresh the home page
open contacts select contacts on menu
tweet/message publish tweet or send message
open messages select direct messages page
open twitter open the Twitter app
open tweets select tweets page
Table 2: Description of the relevant actions for each app.
As explained in Section 4.1, each network flow is modeled
as a set of time series. Table 3 reports the weights and the
intervals for several configurations (“Conf.”in the table) used
to limit the length of the time series generated by each app.
We used different weights configurations, and we selected
the packets intervals by analyzing the statistical length of
the flows. Figure 2 reports the statistical distribution of the
length of the flows app by app. The first quartile, the median
and the third quartile are highlighted by using a notched box
plot. In particular, the median value and the third quartile
have been used as thresholds to limit the maximum length
of the generated time series. For the Twitter app, in some
cases we set the interval in such a way to focus only on the
last three or four packets. Indeed, we noticed that the first
part of the time series was identical for each flow.
To confirm this statement we report in Figure 3 and Fig-
ure 4 the graphical representation of the flows that occur
when executing three different actions in Gmail and Twit-
ter respectively. Comparing the two figures, it can be no-
ticed that the shapes of the actions drastically change for
Gmail, while they are almost unvaried for Twitter. As a
Apps Sets Weights In Out Complete
Gmail
Conf. 1
0.80 [1,4] [1,2] [1,6]
0.20 [1,6] [1,3] [1,9]
Conf. 2
0.66 [1,4] [1,2] [1,6]
0.33 [1,6] [1,3] [1,9]
Conf. 3
0.33 [1,4] [1,2] [1,6]
0.66 [1,6] [1,3] [1,9]
Facebook
Conf. 1
0.66 [1,3] [1,5] [1,7]
0.33 [1,6] [1,7] [1,12]
Conf. 2
0.33 [1,3] [1,5] [1,7]
0.66 [1,6] [1,7] [1,12]
Conf. 3
0.20 [1,3] [1,5] [1,7]
0.80 [1,6] [1,7] [1,12]
Twitter
Conf. 1
0.95 - - [7,10]
0.05 - - [1,10]
Conf. 2
0.95 - - [8,11]
0.05 - - [1,11]
Conf. 3
0.95 - - [8,10]
0.05 - - [1,10]
Table 3: Weights set configurations and packets intervals for
Gmail, Facebook and Twitter apps.
Figure 2: Statistical distribution of the length of the com-
plete time series extracted from the network traffic. First
and third quartile are represented as the left and right side of
the notched box. The notch of the box represents the median
value. Lines that extend horizontally from the boxes indi-
cate the 2nd percentile (left) and the 98th percentile (right).
matter of fact, different Twitter actions just differ in their
last packets. Nevertheless, our approach reaches very good
performance also for this app. In our experiments, we used
the Random forest classifier implemented by scikit-learn li-
braries [2]. The classifier is trained using 40 estimators, with
the square root of the number of the features as max feature
selection value for each estimator, and the bootstrap option
activated. Each estimator (i.e., weak learner) consists in a
decision tree without any restrictions on its depth limit.
5.3 Classification Performance
One of the issues to discuss before proceeding to the clas-
sification of the user actions is the number of clusters to
consider. In order to establish a reasonable value for this
parameter, we used a validation dataset to study the accu-
racy of the classification when varying the number of clus-
ters. Figure 5 reports the achieved results. For each app,
we therefore considered the number of clusters that maxi-
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Figure 3: Representation of three different Gmail actions.
Figure 4: Representation of three different Twitter ac-
tions.
Figure 5: Classification accuracy over number of clusters.
mized the accuracy, in terms of averaged F-measure. In the
following, we report the results of the classification app by
app. In particular, we discuss the average accuracy reached
when detecting each sensitive user action, we report the cor-
responding confusion matrices, and detailed results for the
precision, the recall and the F-measure metrics.
5.3.1 Facebook
We focused on seven different actions that may be sensitive
when using the Facebook app. On average, the F-measure
is equal to 99%, with a precision and a recall of 99% and
98% respectively. Performance reached with different con-
figurations of weights and packets intervals constraints are
reported in Figure 6. For each action at least one of the
configurations exceeds 94% of accuracy, while the worst per-
forming is always higher than 74%.
Table 4 reports precision, recall and F-measure reached by
using Configuration 3. We noticed that all the actions have
a precision higher 96%. The recall is higher than 95% for
all the actions but the open user profile, that reaches 91%.
In effect we realized that this particular action is classified
as other in 9% of the examples, as we can see from the
confusion matrix reported in Figure 7.
Actions Precision Recall F-measure
send message 1.00 1.00 1.00
post user status 1.00 0.95 0.97
open user profile 0.96 0.91 0.94
open message 0.98 1.00 0.99
status button 1.00 1.00 1.00
post on wall 1.00 0.98 0.99
open facebook 1.00 1.00 1.00
other 0.99 1.00 0.99
Average 0.99 0.98 0.99
Table 4: Classification results of Facebook actions by using
Configuration 3.
5.3.2 Gmail
We analyzed four specific user actions of the Gmail app:
send mail, reply button, open chats and send reply. Figure 8
shows the classification accuracy that has been reached. We
observe that we are able to distinguish with high accuracy
the action of sending of a new mail, from that of replying to a
previously received message, as well as the tap over the reply
button. The open chats action is instead more difficult to
distinguish. Table 5 reports precision, recall and F-measure
for different configurations of weights and packets intervals
constraints. We can observe that the action open chats (that
allows to read past chats) achieves a low precision but a high
recall. Analyzing the confusion matrix depicted in Figure 9
it is possible to notice that 16% of other actions wrongly
classified as open chats. This is the reason of such a low
precision.
5.3.3 Twitter
During the analysis we noticed that Twitter actions may be
more difficult to classify than Gmail and Facebook actions.
Indeed, different Twitter actions generate similar time series
that have in common a large portion. Only the last three
or four packets of each time series show some difference.
Nevertheless, we have been able to reach outstanding results
also for this app. In particular, we focus on six specific user
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Figure 6: Classification accuracy of the Facebook user
actions.
Figure 7: Facebook user actions confusion matrix for
Configuration 3.
Figure 8: Classification accuracy of the Gmail user ac-
tions.
Figure 9: Gmail user actions confusion matrix for Con-
figuration 1.
Figure 10: Classification accuracy of the Twitter user
actions.
Figure 11: Twitter user actions confusion matrix for Con-
figuration 1.
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Actions Precision Recall F-measure
send mail 1.00 1.00 1.00
reply button 0.85 1.00 0.92
open chats 0.36 0.94 0.52
send reply 0.98 1.00 0.99
other 0.99 0.82 0.90
Average 0.83 0.85 0.86
Table 5: Classification results of Gmail actions reached by
using Configuration 1.
Actions Precision Recall F-measure
refresh home 0.94 0.99 0.96
open contacts 0.97 0.96 0.97
tweet/message 0.97 1.00 0.98
open messages 1.00 0.95 0.97
open twitter 1.00 1.00 1.00
open tweets 1.00 0.95 0.97
other 0.96 0.96 0.96
Average 0.98 0.97 0.97
Table 6: Classification results of Twitter actions reached by
using the Configuration 1.
actions: refresh home, open contacts, tweet/message, open
messages, open twitter, open tweets.
On average, the F-measure is equal to 97%, with a precision
and a recall of 98% and 97% respectively (see Table 6). Per-
formance reached are reported in Figure 10. For each action
at least one of the configurations exceeds 96% of accuracy,
while the worst configuration has an accuracy in any case
higher than 91%. The action open twitter has accuracy and
recall equal to 100%, independently of the Configuration set
used for the clustering phase. As a consequence, none of
examples of the test set have been wrongly classified. Fig-
ure 11 reports the confusion matrix obtained by considering
the Twitter actions. Three of the six analyzed actions are
correctly classified in more than the 99% of the cases. How-
ever, the other three actions, open contacts, open messages
and open tweets are correctly classified in more than 95% of
the cases.
6. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
Users and service providers might believe that their two par-
ties communications are secure if they use the right encryp-
tion and authentication mechanisms. Unfortunately, cur-
rent secure communication mechanisms limit their traffic
encryption actions to the syntax of the transmitted data.
The semantic of the communication is not protected in any
way [25]. For this reason, it has been possible for example
to develop classifiers for TLS/SSL encrypted traffic that are
able to discriminate between applications.
The contribution of this paper was to investigate to which
extent it is feasible to identify the specific actions that a
user is doing on his mobile device, by simply eavesdropping
the device’s network traffic. While it is out of the scope
of the paper to investigate possible countermeasure to the
proposed attack, we discuss in the following some related
issues.
One common belief is that simple padding techniques may
be effective against traffic analysis approaches. However, it
has to be considered that padding countermeasures are al-
ready standardized in TLS, explicitly to “frustrate attacks
on a protocol that are based on analysis of the lengths of
exchanged messages” [14]. Nevertheless, our attack worked
against TLS encrypted traffic. More advanced techniques
have been proposed in the literature, such as traffic morph-
ing and direct target sampling [44, 45]. However, a recent
result showed that none of the existing countermeasures are
effective [16]. The intuition is that coarse information is
unlikely to be hidden efficiently, and the analysis of these
features may still allow an accurate analysis. On the light
of these results, we believe it is not trivial to propose effec-
tive countermeasures to the attack we shown in this paper.
Indeed, it is intention of the authors to highlight a problem
that is becoming even more alarming after the revelation
about the mass surveillance programs that are nowadays
adopted by governments and nation states.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a framework to analyze encrypted network
traffic and to infer which particular actions the user ex-
ecuted on some apps installed on his mobile-phone. We
demonstrated that despite the use of SSL/TLS, our traffic
analysis approach is an effective tool that an eavesdropper
can leverage to undermine the privacy of mobile users. With
this tool an adversary may easily learn habits of the target
users. The adversary may aggregate data of thousand users
in order to gain some commercial or intelligence advantage
against some competitor. In addition, a powerful attacker
such as a Government, could use these insights in order to
de-anonimize user actions that may be of particular interest.
We hope that this work will shed light on the possible at-
tacks that may undermine the user privacy, and that it will
stimulate researchers to work on efficient countermeasures
that can be adopted also on mobile devices. These coun-
termeasures may require a kind of trade-off between power
efficiency and the required privacy level.
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